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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V, : Case No. 950786-CA 
SANDRA WALKER, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11&nt. : 
BRttEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions on two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet 
of a church, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix)(1996), and one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, also 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv)(1996). The Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where the written plea agreement does not reveal any 
prosecutorial promise to remain silent at sentencing and where 
neither party could produce any evidence that the prosecution had 
agreed to remain silent at sentencing, can defendant prevail in 
his contention that the State breached the plea agreement by 
recommending prison? 
In the absence of any factual showing on the record to 
support defendant's contention, this Court uhas no choice but to 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 788 p.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah), cert, denied, 800 p.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant law is cited in the body of this brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty in two cases to three second degree 
felonies, arising out of her possession of various controlled 
substances (Tr. 8-11; #480 at 41-42/ #481 at 36)-1 The court 
1
 The record on appeal contains a single transcript, which 
includes all of the relevant trial court proceedings, and is 
designated wTr." in this brief. The record on appeal also 
contains two trial court records. Throughout this brief, case 
2 
subsequently sentenced defendant to concurrent one-to-fifteen 
year terms in the Utah State Prison on each count (Tr. 32; #4 80 
at 44, #481 at 36). This timely appeal followed (#480 at 51; 
#481 at 40). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was originally charged, in two cases, with two 
first degree felonies, one second degree felony, and one class A 
misdemeanor (Tr. 8). After initially pleading not guilty to all 
charges, defendant changed her plea and entered guilty pleas to 
three second degree felonies (#480 at 28-29; #481 at 28-29) . 
Prior to entering her pleas, defendant signed a Statement of 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty. See Addendum. In that 
written document, the agreement reached with the State was 
plainly articulated: defendant would enter her pleas in exchange 
for the State's agreement to reduce two first degree felonies to 
second degree felonies, dismiss the class A misdemeanor, and 
forego charging her with a first degree felony in a third, as yet 
uncharged, case (Tr. 33-34 or Addendum). Defendant also 
represented in the written agreement that no threats or promises 
had been made to induce her to enter the pleas and that no one 
number 951900480 will be designated w#480ff and case number 
951900481 will be designated w#481". 
3 
had told her that she would receive any form of leniency as a 
result of her pleas (Tr. 34 or Addendum). 
Prior to accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court 
questioned defendant closely about her understanding and intent 
in entering her pleas. The court asked her if she was pleading 
guilty to the elements of the crimes because she felt she was 
guilty of them, and defendant answered "no" (Tr. 15). The court 
then clarified that defendant was entering her pleas because she 
wished to "avoid the chances of being convicted of a more 
substantial or higher degree felony" (Tr. 16). The court 
specifically confirmed that the pleas had not been induced by any 
promises concerning sentencing (Tr. 16-17). In addition, defense 
counsel made a record with regard to the written plea agreement, 
confirming that his client had read and understood its contents 
(Tr. 21). 
On the date set for sentencing, defendant's assigned counsel 
was not present. Another attorney representing defendant urged 
the court to consider a long-term, in-patient drug treatment 
program for defendant rather than a prison sentence (Tr. 23-24). 
When the court turned to the State for input, the prosecutor 
said: "Your honor, I'm looking for notes in my file, and I -- it 
seems to me like I recall that we may have agreed to remain 
4 
silent on sentencing on this" (Tr. 24). Defense counsel chimed 
in, "That's the plea bargain, yes" (IsL.) . The court then 
continued the matter, ordering defense counsel to "come back with 
some [sentencing] alternatives" (Tr. 25). 
At the sentencing hearing, after several continuances, 
defense counsel reported on four drug treatment programs, none of 
which were available at the time (Tr. 28-29). The court 
responded that it was "inclined to impose the prison sentence" as 
a faster way to get defendant into eventual treatment (Id.). 
After further discussion with defense counsel, the Court turned 
to the State, and the State recommended prison (Tr. 30-31). 
At this juncture, the following interjection occurred: 
Defendant: Your honor, as far as my plea bargain, the 
reason that I signed it is that the state 
would make no recommendation one way or the 
other on sentencing. That was just violated. 
D. Counsel: I think that's correct, your honor. 
Defendant: I know it's correct. That was part of my 
plea bargain. 
(Tr. 31). The transcript at this point indicates that counsel 
for the State searched both his file and the file of his 
predecessor, looking for notes that might corroborate defendant's 
assertion. Counsel for defendant likewise searched through the 
plea agreement for a handwritten note commemorating such an 
5 
agreement (Tr. 31-32). When neither attorney could find any 
corroboration for defendant's statement, the court sentenced 
defendant to three concurrent one-to-fifteen year terms in the 
Utah State Prison (Tr. 32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Before defendant can prevail on the argument that the State 
breached its plea agreement by recommending prison at the 
sentencing hearing, she must first establish that the State 
promised to remain silent at sentencing. Defendant has failed to 
establish this preliminary fact. 
There are two references in the transcript to remaining 
silent at sentencing. The first is a comment by the prosecutor 
questioning her own recollection that the State may have agreed 
to remain silent at sentencing (Tr. 24). The second is a comment 
by defendant stating that she had pled guilty because the State 
promised to make no recommendations at sentencing (Tr. 31). In 
context, however, these remarks do not constitute persuasive 
evidence of any promise by the State to remain silent. 
The record evidence clearly attests to the fact that the 
plea bargain did not include a promise by the State to remain 
silent. First, defendant executed a Statement of Defendant in 
Advance of Plea of Guilty, which precisely articulated the terms 
6 ••• 
of the plea bargain and never made any reference to a promise by 
the State to remain silent. And second, in the course of the 
guilty plea hearing, the court closely questioned defendant about 
her understanding and intent in entering the plea. Not only did 
defendant confirm that no promises had been made to her, but she 
also explained that she was entering the plea in order to avoid 
the possibility of convictions on three first degree felonies. 
In the context of this evidence, the prosecutor's remark is 
fairly construed as an effort not to speak out unadvisedly, while 
defendant's contention that a promise was made stands as an 
attempt to capitalize on the prosecutor's earlier uncertainty. 
Because the record contains no evidence that the State promised 
to remain silent in exchange for defendant's guilty plea, 
defendant's contention that the State breached the plea agreement 
fails. 
I ARGUMENT 
WHERE THE RECORD ON APPEAL PROVIDES 
NO EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE PROMISED 
TO REMAIN SILENT AT SENTENCING, THE 
STATE DID NOT BREACH THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT BY RECOMMENDING PRISON AT 
THE SENTENCING HEARING 
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the State, by 
recommending prison at the sentencing hearing, broke a promise 
7 
central to defendant's plea bargain (Br. of App. at 5). Because 
close examination of the record evidence relevant to this 
contention fails to support the existence of any promise by the 
State to remain silent, defendant's claim must fail. 
The law is well-settled that a guilty plea must be knowing 
and voluntary. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1996); State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987); State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 
1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989). And, if a plea is induced by any 
promises, "the essence of those promises must in some way be 
known." Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971). It 
logically follows, then, that wwhen a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262. The 
predicate condition for fulfillment of a promise, however, is 
that a promise was actually made.2 In this case, the record does 
not demonstrate that a promise to remain silent was ever made. 
Defendant's assertion that the State promised to remain 
2
 Defendant urges application of the Santobello rule, 
arguing that the facts are closely analogous to this case. See 
Br. of App. at 7-8. The dispositive difference, however, is that 
in Santobello, the State conceded it had promised to remain 
silent at sentencing. Here, the State makes no such concession. 
8 
silent at sentencing hangs on two record references. During the 
first hearing scheduled for sentencing, after defense counsel 
recommended that defendant be sentenced to a drug treatment 
program, the court turned to the prosecutor, who commented, "Your 
Honor, I'm looking for notes in my file, and I -- it seems to me 
like I recall that we may have agreed to remain silent on 
sentencing on this" (Tr. 24). Defense counsel, who had not been 
present during the plea taking, stated, "That's the plea bargain, 
yes" (Id.). The court then continued the proceeding without 
resolving the matter (Tr. 25). 
The only other relevant reference came from defendant 
herself at the sentencing hearing. Just after the State 
recommended prison, defendant announced: "Your Honor, as far as 
my plea bargain, the reason that I signed it is that the State 
would make no recommendation one way or the other on sentencing. 
That was just violated" (Tr. 31). Defendant's assigned counsel 
opined: "I think that's correct, your Honor" (Id.). Both parties 
then searched their respective records for written commemoration 
of the promise. None was found. 
On the basis of this scant record evidence -- the State's 
ambivalent musing and defendant's own assertions -- defendant 
presumes the existence of a promise that was central to the entry 
9 
of her guilty pleas. Examining these two references in the 
context of the entire record, however, reveals no persuasive 
evidence of a promise. 
First, the prosecutor's comment is nothing but that --a 
comment. She wondered aloud if the State had promised to remain 
silent, and then looked in her file to verify her possible 
recollection (Tr. 24). Although the matter was not pursued at 
that time, it came up again at sentencing. The prosecutor who 
had taken over the case searched both his file and his 
predecessor's, finding no notes to substantiate any promise to 
remain silent (Tr. 31-32). Thus, in the context of written and 
oral evidence explicitly stating the terms of the plea bargain, 
the State's comment is most fairly construed as the musing of a 
prosecutor who handled numerous cases on a daily basis and did 
not want to err by speaking out unadvisedly on one of them. 
Other more substantial evidence clearly attests to the fact 
that the plea bargain did not include a promise by the State to 
remain silent. Prior to entering her plea, defendant executed a 
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, which 
precisely articulated the terms agreed to by the parties: 
13. The only plea agreement which has been 
entered into with the government is: In 
consideration of guilty pleas the State 
10 
agrees to reduce two first degree felonies to 
possession of a controlled substance within 
1000 feet of a church 2nd-Degree [sic]. The 
State further agrees to dismiss the 
possession of Marijuana charge (Class "A") 
and not file other charges they know about. 
R. 33-34 or Addendum. In addition, defendant attested in the 
Statement that wno promises of any sort [other than those 
articulated in the Statement] have been made to me to induce me 
or to persuade me to enter this plea" (R. 34 or Addendum). She 
also affirmed that no one had told her she would receive any form 
of leniency as a result of entering her plea (Id.) .3 The written 
plea agreement, then, contains not a shred of evidence supporting 
defendant's contention that she was induced to enter the plea by 
a promise that the State would remain silent at sentencing. 
The guilty plea hearing provides more evidence that such a 
promise never existed and, in addition, reveals the reason 
defendant chose to plead guilty. First, the trial court 
specifically questioned defendant about the existence of any 
promises: 
The Court: Have there been any promises of what the 
sentence is that could be imposed? 
3
 At the plea hearing, her counsel made a record concerning 





Well, I understand there's to be no 
promises made because the final decision 
is yours. 
But you understand -- but you --do you 
understand that? That the final -- that 
the choice will be the judge who imposes 
sentence, whether that be me or someone 
else? 
Defendant: (unintelligible)4 
Tr. 16-17. Certainly, in this interchange, the court afforded 
defendant the opportunity to reveal the promise she now asserts 
was pivotal to her plea. Significantly, she offered nothing. 
The same hearing also reveals the practical reason for 
defendant entering her guilty pleas, independent of her 
contention that she did so primarily on the basis of the State's 
alleged "promise." In the course of the trial court questioning 
defendant about her understanding and intent in entering a plea, 
the following interchange occurred: 
The Court: Now, are you pleading guilty to the 
elements because you feel you are guilty 
of them? Is that correct: 
Defendant: No. 
The Court: Okay. Explain that to me, 
4
 While defendant's final response was apparently unclear, 
the fact that the court then moved on to a different topic 
supports the inference that defendant's answer was affirmative. 
12 
D. Counsel: Explain that, Your Honor, under -- she's 
entering these pleas under Alvord [sic] 
to avoid the exposure to the higher 
first degrees. 
The Court: That's what you're doing. 
Defendant: (unintelligible) 
The Court: And you've been through that with Mr. 
Laker and to avoid the chances of being 
convicted of a more substantial or 
higher degree of felony, that's how you 
want to proceed. Is that correct? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Tr. 15-16. By entering her pleas, then, defendant avoided the 
possibility of three first degree felony convictions, carrying 
with them potential sentences of five years to life in prison. 
Certainly, regardless of her later allegation that the State 
promised to remain silent at sentencing, defendant received the 
expressed benefit of her bargain by avoiding exposure to the more 
serious crimes. 
In the context of this evidence, clearly attesting to the 
terms of the plea agreement, defendant's contention at sentencing 
that she entered the plea because the State promised to remain 
silent at sentencing, is at best a self-serving capitalization on 
the prosecutor's earlier expression of uncertainty. While the 
State must fulfill any promises it makes that are central to the 
13 
plea agreement, defendant must first establish that a promise 
was, in fact, made. See Santobel^o v. New York. 404 U.S. at 262. 
Because the record contains no evidence to support that a promise 
to remain silent at sentencing was ever made, defendant's claim 
that the State breached the plea agreement must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 392-8247 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SANDRA WALKER, : Case No. Of^OOiffi 
Defendant. : Judge 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand 
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of 
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charges against me have been explained. 
I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charges with 
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each 
charge which the government is required to prove. 
2. As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as 
follows: 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 







Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with intent to 
Distribute within lf0Q0 
feet of a church 
Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with intent to 
Distribute within 1,000 
feet of a church 
Possession of a Controlled 
Substance witnin 1,000 
feet of a church 
Possession of Controlled 
Substance witnin 1,000 
feet of a church 
3. The possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the 








5-life U.S.P. &/or 
$10,000.00 fine. 
5-life U.S.P. &/or 
$10,000.00 fine. 
1-15 years U.S.P. &/or 
$10,000.00 fine. 
Up to one (1) year 
N.C.J. &/or $2,500.00 
fine. 
Possession of a Controlled 
Substance within 1,000 
feet of a church 
Possession of a Controlled 
Substance within 1,000 
feet of a church 










1-15 years U.S.P. &/or 
$10,000.00 fine. 
1-15 years U.S.P. &/or 
$10,000.00 fine. 
1-15 years U.S.P. 4/or 
$10«000.00 fine. 
4. I understand that the elements of the offenses I am 
pleading guilty to are: That I possessed cocaine, knowingly and 
intentionally within 1000 feet of a church. 
5. I Know that I can be represented by an attorney at every 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 
stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. 
6. I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty,•» and I 
know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea. 
1. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that 
if I were to stand trial by a jury: 
a. I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every 
stage of the proceeding. 
b. I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who 
testify against me. 
c. My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who 
testify against me. 
d. I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can 
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness and 
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them. 
e. I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not 
have to testify at any trial. 
f • If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told that 
no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure to 
testify. 
g. The government must prove each and every element of the 
offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt, 
h. A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict me. 
i. If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 
afford the cost of such an appeal, the government will pay the 
costs of the appeal including the services of appointed 
counsel. 
8. Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of any 
kind, and I am waiving my rights listed in the previous paragraph 
and admitting that I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of 
guilty is entered. 
9. There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence 
imposed under a plea of guilty. 
10. No agreements have been reached and no representations 
have been made to me as to what the sentence will be. 
XI* I know that under the Laws of Utah, the possible maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the 
charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in 
paragraph three above. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have 
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask 
me questions about the offense to which the plea is entered. 
13. The only plea agreement which has been entered into with 
the government is: In consideration of guilty pleas the State 
agrees to reduce three- first degree felonies to possession of a 
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church 2nd-Degree. The 
State further agrees to dismiss the possession of Marijiuana chagre 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 
(Class "A") and not file other charge*they know about. 
14. I have a right to ask the court any questions I wish to 
ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea. 
* * * 
I make the following representations to the Court: 
1. I a n M years of age. My education consists of 12 
years. I can read and understand English. 
2. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me 
to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea. 
3. No one has told me that I would receive probation or any 
other form of leniency because of my plea. 
4. I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty within 30 day of entry of the plea, but if said request is 
not made within 30 days I forfeit this right. A motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and 
is within the discretion of the Court. 
5. I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer as 
much as I wish to. 
6. I am satisfied with my lawyer. 
7. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and 
careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full 
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case 
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 
plea was Bade and I am not now under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants. 
8. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea. 
DATED this o2£& day of July, 1995. 
/&AXY/. L//e^ 
DEFEND; 
I certify that I have discussed this statement with the 
Defendant that I have fully explained her rights and believe that 
she is knowing and voluntarily entering the plea with full 
knowledge of her legal rights and the there is a factual basis for 
the plea. 
DATED this Z&- day of July, 1£95. il  1S95. 
DEFENSE^ATTORNEY^ J 
I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant 
in Advance of Plea of Guilty and that said statement correctly 
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties. 
DATED this day of July. 1995* 
O R D E R 
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the 
presence of the undersigned Judge. 
STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 
Based upon the facts 6et forth in the foregoing Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, The Court finds the 
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is 
ordered that the Defendant's plea of •guilty" to the charge(s) set 
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered. 
DONE in Court this a2.C day of July, 1995. 
DISTRICT "COURT JJ& 
